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SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Kent Greenawalt*

This essay is divided into three categories: some brief remarks
about forms of secularism, an outline of American constitutional law as
it relates to religion, and a discussion from the standpoint of political
philosophy of the proper place of religion (and other similar
perspectives) in making political decisions within liberal democracies.
Because the audience for whom the oral comments from which the
essay is derived was mainly non-American, the middle part of the essay
sets out many propositions familiar to anyone acquainted with this
branch of constitutional law. And because of the informal nature of the
original presentation, I offer my own views without extensive citation or
detailed analysis. Except for the first part on secularism, everything in
the essay is defended in two volumes I have written on the religion
clauses, 1 and the third part adopts much of the actual language of one
chapter. 2 With some frequency, I footnote to chapters in the books to
provide the reader an easy way to assess what I have said. In these
chapters, one can find references to relevant cases and significant
scholarly work.
I.

VARIETIES OF SECULARISM

Secularism can be a confusing and slippery term. In some of its
modern uses, it can refer broadly to social values or to the political
order, and it can mean a kind of hostility or negative attitude toward
religion or a sort of neutrality or indifference.
Communist countries in the twentieth century were, for the most
part, explicitly antireligious. They did not strive to stamp out traditional
religion altogether, but they discouraged it and taught Marxist atheism
in the schools. One who wanted to rise in the Party or government

• University Professor, Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School.
I l KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS (2006) [hereinafter FREE EXERCISE]; 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008) [hereinafter ESTABLISHMENT].
2 ESTABLISHMENT,supra note I, ch. 23.
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would not openly be a churchgoer. In much milder form, I think that
modem Turkey and France have similarly tried to counter traditional
religion and its influence, at least in political life, although without
explicitly endorsing atheism.
As far as the law is concerned, the United States is secular in a
very different sense. The basic idea is that the government is to leave
religious practice free and to stay out of religion. Just as government is
not to exercise religious authority, so also religious leaders are not to
exercise political authority. But people can be openly religious and
succeed in politics; indeed, someone who admits to atheism is highly
unlikely to succeed. And it has never been broadly assumed that
religious groups should refrain from political involvement. In our
recent history, the most active religious groups have been theologically
conservative and on the political right; but religious leaders on the left
were vital in the abolitionist movement against slavery, in the civil
rights movement of the 1960's, and in opposition to the Vietnam War.
And one might expect their influence will increase with the Obama
administration.
Whatever may be the stance of law and government, I believe we
can think of cultures as being heavily religious or secular. In Puritan
Massachusetts, religion was at the center of social life, and in the
nineteenth century, ordinary sermons of clergy were routinely reported
in the press. That no longer happens. Although most citizens sincerely
say they are religious and that religion is important in their lives, much
popular culture, and also elite culture if there is a difference, is
dominantly nonreligious. It is a rare movie or T.V. show that seriously
treats issues about religion, although various books with religious
themes sell widely.
As with the law, our secular culture is not antireligious. It is more
nearly indifferent to religion as such. However, many political liberals,
both those who themselves have no religious convictions and those
whose theology is liberal, do tend to be dismayed over theologically
conservative evangelical Christians, partly because these Christians tend
to support politically conservative measures, such as restrictive abortion
laws and a refusal of equal rights to gay people, and tend to reject wellestablished scientific theories in favor of biblical literalism.
Many Americans have a vague idea that religion is essentially a
private matter-between a person and his or her God (or some analogue
of God)-and sometimes secularism is understood as relegating religion
to the private realm. Many other Americans participate actively in
corporate religion and think religion speaks to broad aspects of social
life. One might believe that religious groups, whatever other ways they
may reach out to the broader culture, should stay out of politics, but
such a view is neither part of our history nor any present consensus. I
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return to the subject of religion and politics after summarizing some of
the basic law in the United States as it touches religion.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND RELATED NORMS IN THE UNITED ST ATES

A.

The Two Religion Clauses

The First Amendment to our Federal Constitution says, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof' before going on to protect freedom of speech
and freedom of association. These original clauses left states free to
establish religion if they chose, and about half the states then had some
form of establishment. The last of these ended in 1833.3
According to the Supreme Court, the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment made most of the Bill of Rights, including the religion
clauses, applicable against the states.
The Free Exercise Clause protects freedom of belief and worship.
The government cannot penalize people or deny them privileges
because it disapproves of their religion. It can, however, prohibit
harmful actions even if they are aspects of religious ceremonies. It can,
for example, prohibit child sacrifice or snake handling.
The two clauses together are understood to require equal treatment
of various religions, and to forbid discrimination on religious grounds
by the government. Statutes passed by Congress and the states extend a
rule of nondiscrimination to private businesses, hotels, restaurants,
hospitals, and so on. The two clauses together are also taken to forbid
courts from deciding what version of a religion is the true one or is most
faithful to a tradition. Suppose, in the present Anglican controversy
over the ordination of gay priests and bishops, a local Episcopalian
church withdraws from the national communion. A court must resolve
the dispute over who gets the church building on some basis other than
faithfulness to Anglican tradition and practice. 4

B.

Free Exercise

The big issue over free exercise concerns laws that are not
themselves directed against religious practice. If a law, say against

3 Id., ch. 2.
4 Two recent Episcopalian cases decided by highest state courts are Episcopal Diocese of
Rochester v. Harnish, 899 N.E. 2d 920 (N.Y. 2008), and In re Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d
66 (Cal. 2009).

2386

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:6

using peyote, is generally valid, do members of a religion have any free
exercise claim to use peyote in worship services? For roughly three
decades the Supreme Court, and courts below it, entertained such
claims.s The linguistic standard was that the government could stop
such behavior only if it had a "compelling interest" that could not be
satisfied in another way. The compelling interest language was always
misleading; noncompelling interests were taken to be strong enough.
But in 1990 the Supreme Court essentially wiped out the free exercise
right altogether. If a law was generally valid, that was the end of the
inquiry. Legislatures could grant exemptions if they wished, but the
Constitution did not require them. Congress and some states have
responded by putting the compelling interest language into legislation.
Thus, a small Brazilian sect was able to import a tea for its worship that
contains a forbidden hallucinogenic substance.
When exemptions are granted on the basis of religion, courts need
to make some inquiries that can be difficult. What counts as religion?
Are those making a claim sincere? How strong is the burden on their
religion? How strong is the government's competing interest?
This treatment of exemptions is one strong indication that the
secularism of our law, if one calls it that, is not hostile to religion;
indeed, it treats liberty of religious practice as a very important value.
C.

Nonestablishment

In the modem law of the religion clauses, there are certain tensions
between free exercise and nonestablishment. Promoting free exercise
may sometimes seem to involve an establishment of religion. For the
most part free exercise and nonestablishment go together.
The
historical establishments to which early Americans responded included
outright limits on the exercise of other religions, or at least various
privileges available only to members of the established church.
We can understand free exercise values as involving the
importance of allowing people to profess their beliefs about
transcendent reality and engage in the religious practices that seem right
to them. Giving people the freedom to choose in this area of life is one
vital aspect of personal autonomy. At least within modem cultures
filled with diverse citizens, protecting religious freedom also promotes
social harmony. And it is one crucial recognition of the equality of
citizens. By and large I think these values are best served when the
government refrains from establishing any religion.
Can religious liberty exist with establishment? Of course. Many
5 FREE EXERCISE, supra note I, at 29-33.
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countries in Europe maintain established churches and afford religious
freedom to their citizens. But three cautions are in order. First, these
establishments have become progressively mild over time. Second, I
believe nonestablishment is more enhancing of religious liberty than
even mild establishment. And, third, the comparative vitality of religion
in the United States and most European countries suggests that over
time nonestablishment contributes to religious belief and practice, that
the clumsy hand of government does more to stifle religion than to
enliven it.
One major area of Establishment Clause litigation concerns the
government's involvement in forms of devotion, which I take broadly
here to include the placement of religious symbols on public property.
The most important cases in this domain have involved public schools.
The general position is that the government should not be undertaking
or sponsoring devotional exercises. 6
One notable exception to this position is the government
sponsorship of religion in the military and in prisons. In closed
environments controlled by the government, free exercise may be
possible only if there is a degree of government sponsorship. This is a
domain in which absolute nonestablishment would impinge on free
exercise. There is room for argument about the details of various
programs, but some government support of religion is needed.
Another exception to any strict rule of nonsponsorship concerns
the content of many government ceremonies. President Obama's
inauguration had a lengthy invocation and benediction, with specific
references to God and Christ. The practice of such ceremonies, which
fit the religious convictions of most Americans, undoubtedly conveys a
degree of approval of the religious ideas expressed.
About displays of religious texts and symbols by the government
or on government property, the Court looks to see if a display conveys a
religious message. It is all right to include the Ten Commandments
with other notable examples of fundamental laws; it is all right to
include a creche with secular symbols of Christmas. But public school
authorities cannot require that the Ten Commandments be placed in all
classrooms; the creche cannot be displayed in a manner that reflects
approval of its religious message.
Decisions to this effect were preceded by the Court's rulings that
public schools could not engage in devotional prayer and Bible reading.
Although these rulings are still highly controversial, they seem to me
undoubtedly right.
One problem is that there is no universal prayer and no version of
the Bible acceptable to everyone. Public schools in the nineteenth

6 ESTABLISHMENT, supra

note 1, chs. 4-7.
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century were really nondenominational Protestant. The instruction and
prayers were of a kind most Protestants could approve, and Bible
reading was from the King James Bible. This was one reason why
Roman Catholics regarded themselves as unfairly treated and Catholic
parents were urged to send their children to parochial schools.
But even if one could find a form of prayer and version of the
Bible acceptable to all Christians and Jews, that would still leave as
outsiders Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, atheists, and agnostics. Some
minority children and their parents might not mind the exposure to the
country's dominant religious practices, but for others it would be
seriously offensive.
There is no doubt that a government that
undertakes the devotional practices of a part of its citizenry, even a large
minority, is establishing religion.
The government cannot teach or promote particular religious ideas
as true or sound. This principle is reflected in the cases banning
displays of creches and the Ten Commandments that involved implicit
assertions of religious truths. A minority of Supreme Court justices has
claimed that it is all right for American governments to endorse or
promote the notion of a beneficent God, a notion shared by Christians,
Jews, and Muslims; and it is possible that subsequent appointments to
the Court will tum that minority into a majority. I think that shift would
be unfortunate.
The crucial battlegrounds for the teaching of religious ideas are our
public schools.7 Let me begin with three preliminaries. First, schools
can no more teach atheism or agnosticism as sound than they can teach
the truth of Christianity. Second, in their instruction about science,
morality, and political theory, schools will inevitably teach some ideas
as true that conflict with the doctrines of some religions. In teaching
that the earth is not the center of the universe and that discrimination by
gender and race is unjust, a school will run afoul of the opinions of
some religions. This conflict is unavoidable. What the school cannot
do is directly to teach the truth or falsity of the religious ideas
themselves. Third, although schools cannot teach religious truth, that
does not mean they must refrain from teaching about religion, or
introducing religious texts in courses in literature, or including religious
music at concerts. Religion is a crucial aspect of Western culture and
other cultural traditions around the world. Any education that neglects
it is inadequate. But all these forms of including religion in education
can avoid assertions of theological truth and falsity.
The main controversies over teaching religion in the United States
have occurred with respect to creationism, evolution, and intelligent
design. Few doubt that evolution should be taught; it is by far the

7

Id., chs. 8-9.
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dominant scientific theory about the development of animal and plant
life. As the Supreme Court has held, creationism in a version that fits
the literal text of Genesis does not belong in science courses, even as an
alternative to evolution. The main problem is not the possible mention
of God; one could talk about spontaneous generation without
mentioning God. The basic problem is the lack of real scientific
evidence that the world and its creatures all developed in a few days or
that the major varieties of plants and animals appeared at the same time.
The issue of intelligent design is more complex, indeed a lot more
complex than the proponents on each side make it. No doubt, many of
the present advocates of intelligent design are creationists, trying to get
a piece of the pie since they can't have the whole pie. In Pennsylvania,
a district court rejected a reference to intelligent design mainly on the
basis that the aim of the school board was religious. But that does not
quite tell us what the theory itself claims.
What it claims, I believe, is that there is a limit to science, itself
established by scientific evidence, and that the most plausible way to
account for what science cannot explain is an intelligent designer. So
understood, the theory is neither based on religious premises nor is itself
really a scientific theory.
Let me explain. We are talking here about intelligent design as a
theory that is a competitor to undiluted evolutionary theory, not a view
that one can accept every claim of dominant scientific views and still
believe that all of existence points toward an intelligent creator.
According to this competitor version of intelligent design, when
one compares evolutionary theory with the known facts about the world,
one can see that neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory falls short in
explaining all that has developed. Evolution may explain a lot, but it
can't explain everything, and its very premises make it unlikely that it
will fill the gaps in the future. When we reflect on what may be needed
to fill the gaps, an intelligent designer ( or designers) is the most likely
explanation. So put, the theory rests on facts discovered empirically or
in a scientific way.
Why is this not a scientific explanation? Because what it uses to
fill the gaps does not tell in an empirical way what causes the designer
to act or will lead to his future action. It provides an explanation that
goes beyond science to tell us what science cannot explain. It is about
the limits of science. Once one understands that, it is easy to see why
no one should expect positive evidence for intelligent design.
If the theory does not yield a scientific explanation, isn't it
nevertheless appropriate in science courses to teach about the limits of
science? Put this way, I think the answer is yes.
However, it is an extreme stretch to offer intelligent design as the
alternative to neo-Darwinian evolution. First, it is quite possible that
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neo-Darwinian theory can, or will in the future be able to, explain all
that it aims to explain. And if some revision or supplement to the
theory turns out to be needed, we have no basis to suppose that it will be
beyond science. Science has again and again proved able to explain
things that once seemed beyond science. At most, intelligent design is
one possible explanation for any gaps that present evolutionary theory
may leave. I think it should be constitutionally permissible for a science
teacher to mention it in that way, although given the overwhelming
assurance of scientists that evolutionary theory is as complete and as
persuasive as many other scientific theories, the more prudent course is
to mention that some believe it leaves gaps, without getting into just
how those gaps might be filled.
A qualification of sorts to the principle that the government cannot
promote religious ideas: A degree of equal treatment has been said to be
required by the free speech clause. If a government makes space
available to private persons to express all sorts of ideas, or a school
makes space available for clubs after school, it cannot exclude religious
ideas or religious clubs.s
The majority of Supreme Court cases under the Establishment
Clause have involved financial aid to parochial schools.9 The Supreme
Court has moved from being very restrictive about such aid to
approving a significant voucher plan in 2002, under which private
nonprofit schools could receive a significant percentage of the tuition
costs for students from relatively poor families. The vast majority of
schools benefiting were religious.
To understand this development, it helps to clarify two points and
to draw an important distinction. The first point is that a state or
municipality can, if it chooses, finance only public education; it need
not help pay for private education, however onerous the resulting
burden on parents who feel their children must be educated in religious
or other nonpublic schools. The second point is that a state cannot favor
religious schools over other nonprofit private schools.
The important distinction is between pre-college education and
other benefits religious groups provide. Although disagreement exists
over whether religious groups should be able to use religious criteria in
hiring for programs supported by public money, few doubt that religious
adoption agencies, hospitals, and soup kitchens may be aided along with
nomeligious ones.10
It is only aid to parochial schools that has generated intense
controversy. For much of the country's history, the great majority of
these schools have been Roman Catholic. Many have seen in the
8 Id., ch. 11.
9 Id., ch. 19.
IO For issues that do arise with such aid, see id., ch. 18.
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resistance to aid an indefensible anti-Catholic bias, and it would be
foolish to deny that element. But the full explanation is more complex.
The ideal of the public school as a melting pot that draws in children of
all religious and national and ethnic backgrounds, and produces citizens
of a single nation, has long had a powerful hold; and public schools
over the years have helped to create a country that enjoys a degree of
unity out of incredible diversity. It is also true that if one goes back to
the nineteenth century, one finds statements by popes that are hostile to
liberal democracy, and perhaps it was not until the Second Vatican
Council that the Church outside the United States fully embraced
central ideals of liberal democracy.
Whatever the full explanation, from the late 1940's onward, the
Court took the position that only fringe aids, ones that did not support
religious teaching, were permissible. Towns could pay for bus
transportation and the loan of secular textbooks, but could not help pay
the salaries of teachers. After a steady erosion in this separationist
approach, the Court seven years ago upheld extensive voucher aid,
funneled through parental choice. Schools could spend the money as
they chose.
Many state constitutions contain stricter limits on aid to religious
education, and in a case involving college education that seemed likely
to be for the ministry, the Supreme Court sustained that stricter
approach against a claim that it violated the Free Exercise Clause by
treating religious education worse than other education.
D.

Exemptions and Establishment Limits

Whether exemptions come from the Free Exercise Clause or
statutes, there are Establishment Clause limits. 11 The Court has rightly
held that it violates the clause if burdens that are too great are imposed
on private businesses or individuals.
A more controversial issue is just how nonreligious people who
have analogous claims should be treated. The Supreme Court managed
to avoid that constitutional question for conscientious objectors to
military service by reading the statute adopted by Congress to include
the nonreligious objectors, a reading that contravened the language and
bore no resemblance to the intent of Congress. I believe in some
circumstances, nonreligious claimants must be treated like religious
ones, and I think this is true of objection to military service, but for
other subjects, such as the use of proscribed drugs at meetings,
legislatures may draw the line at religious use in worship services.
II ld.,ch 16-17.
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RELIGIOUS PREMISES AND THE POLITICS OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACIEs12

I tum now to an issue about which the religious clauses of our
constitution have little to say directly. Suppose citizens or officials rely
on religious premises in adopting laws to protect animals, help the poor,
or restrict abortions. The aim is not to promote religion or endorse a
religious view but to do what is just or good from one's religious
perspective. Does that offend some idea of what liberal democracies, or
a particular liberal democracy, should be like? This has been regarded
in recent decades as a significant issue of political philosophy.
Influenced by the writings of John Rawls, political philosophers
have debated whether political decisions in liberal democracies should
be based on public reasons, reasons accessible in the right way to all
citizens. It is generally assumed that reasons grounded in religious
premises fall outside the domain of public reasons. If citizens and
officials improperly rely heavily on religious premises in advocating
and adopting laws, we could think of that as a misguided
"establishment" of religion, although not one necessarily covered by the
Establishment Clause.
People who challenge the injection of religion in politics adopt
what we may call-with some oversimplification-an "exclusive"
position. Religion should not be the basis for crucial political decisions.
In the politics of pluralist liberal democracies, decisions (they claim)
should be made on grounds that are shared premises of that form of
government and on forms of justification and ways of determining facts
that are accessible to all citizens. Whatever is the exact mix of the
rational, nonrational, and irrational in religious understandings, no
religious perspective is shared by all citizens, no perspective rests on
methods of justification and determining facts that are accessible in the
required way. To some extent, religious belief depends on faith,
personal experience, and distinctive tradition; adherents of one religion
cannot present "logical" arguments that alone will persuade outsiders to
their views. Religious belief and practice is fine for individuals and
communities of faith, and religious perspectives may enrich our cultural
understandings. But at least when citizens are coerced, the state acts
unfairly unless it has reasons that have force for all citizens. Religious
reasons, along with other grounds such as those based on simple
personal intuition or on comprehensive views like utilitarianism, do not
fall into this category. They should not undergird laws in democratic
countries. This is a matter of fairness, and also of political stability.
12 Id., ch. 23.
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Neither citizens nor officials should present religious reasons in public
debate; neither group should rely on such reasons.
Some brief clarifications about this "exclusive" position can help
avoid confusion. First, it concerns politics, not broader public culture.
Second, no one claims that people will be wholly uninfluenced by
religious understandings. Any claim of that sort would be extremely
naive. People should discuss political issues in public without reliance
on religious premises and they should try to make up their minds
accordingly. Third, the claim is not that religion is foolish superstition
and therefore deserves no place in our political life. Of course, all
arguments based on foolish superstition should be avoided, but if that
were the basis for excluding religion, the exclusion would have to rest
on persuasive argument that religion is foolish superstition. A high
percentage of Americans identify themselves as religious; one can't
reasonably suppose they should avoid religion in politics because
religion is foolish.
Finally, we have to be careful about what the "exclusive" position
entails. What is mainly being urged is "self-exclusion." No one
proposes that anyone can be punished or silenced for making religious
arguments; indeed, guarantees of free speech and free exercise protect
such arguments. The proposal is that people should refrain from
making religious arguments because they do not fit with how liberal
democracies should work.
I have remarked that it is something of an oversimplification to call
this position "exclusive." The exact nuances of what is claimed differ
among those who support this general approach. Rawls made clear in
his later writings that a person could appropriately offer religious or
other nonpublic reasons if she also offered public reasons and believed
that those alone were sufficient to justify the political stance she
advocated. Thus, an advocate of legislation protecting animals against
abuse could supplement public reasons she believed adequate to support
the restraint with further reasons based on her religious convictions.
When he was still a senator, Barack Obama suggested a position
that is both more and less constraining. 13 He said that believers could
not be expected to leave their religious convictions at the door but
should translate those concerns into "universal rather than religiousspecific values." This position is more constraining in supposing that
explicitly religious reasons should not be offered in support of political
stances in the public square; it is less constraining in allowing people to
advocate views even if they doubt that they can be sustained by
13 Senator Barack Obama, Call to Renewal Keynote Address (June 28, 2006), available at
http://obamaspeeches.com/081-Call-to-Renewal-Keynote-Address-Obama-Speech.htm. He takes
a similar position in THE AUDACITY OF HOPE. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE
195-226 (2006).
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persuasive public reasons. To revert to our advocate of animal rights,
so long as she can present plausible universal reasons, she can
appropriately support the legislation even if she believes in her heart of
hearts that those reasons would not be sufficient to justify the
legislation.
I do not mean to suggest that President Obama has worked out all
the nuances of this issue in great detail, but the expressed thoughts of
the person who is now the most important political figure in the United
States hold interest for that reason alone, and they suffice to illustrate
two ways in which the "exclusive" position can vary.
The competing "inclusive" position is that citizens and officials
should be able to rely on whatever sources of understanding seem to
them most reliable and illuminating. If a respected religious authority
like the Pope, or a divinely inspired text, or one's personal sense of how
God relates to human beings, suggests that we should help those who
are less fortunate, why should that not count for our position on welfare
reform and medical insurance? People do not feel whole if they try to
divorce their deepest sources of insight from their political stances.
Moreover, shared premises and methods of justification are too thin to
resolve many political issues; they just do not settle enough in a society
as diverse and divided as our own. Fairness consists not in exclusion,
not even in self-exclusion, but in everyone relying on what they find is
most convincing. Indeed, the ability to rely on one's religious
convictions is part of the free exercise of religion. A full airing of all
those views will enrich everyone's understanding. People can often
learn from others who do not share their fundamental religious beliefs.
A healthy democracy will not be unstable if religious arguments are part
of political discourse.
For the inclusive position, only one clarification is required. A
defender of that position need not claim that every ground for a political
position is appropriate. Some grounds may be contrary to premises of
liberal democracy. We now suppose that racism and other denials of
equal worth fall into this category. But religion has never been so
regarded in the United States.
As I have put it so far, the controversy about religious grounds
seems fairly straightforward, if not easy to resolve; but matters are in
fact much more complicated. No one claims that it is only religious
reasons that are excluded by public reasons, and deciding which reasons
count as public is not simple. Perhaps we might do better to think of
reasons that are more or less public. And I shall argue that it should
make a crucial difference for whether one should rely on nonpublic
reasons whether he or she is an ordinary citizen or an official and, if an
official, engaging in public discourse or employing grounds of
judgment.
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Theorists disagree over exactly what makes reasons nonpublic.
Among the candidates that have been suggested are ideas of the good
(or controversial ideas of the good), nomational grounds, reasons that
are not widely accepted, and comprehensive views (roughly,
overarching philosophies of life).
Some of the difficulties with deciding what count as "public
reasons" may be illustrated with reference to natural law theory, a
theory that relies heavily on premises claimed to have rational force
apart from any religious beliefs, but also makes various assertions that
do not seem persuasive to many observers. 14
Whatever the exact range of public reasons, they do not include
reasons drawn from biblical revelation or church authority.
It is sometimes asserted that the requirement of public reasons
applies only to some subset of political decisions. One notion is that
coercive laws, in particular, should be based on public reasons, since
people should not be compelled on the basis of reasons that are not
persuasive for them. But what of a government refusal to fund stem cell
research? We know that the government would fund this research were
it not for a concern about embryos. If it refuses to fund embryonic stem
cell research, many scientists will not do that work, and sufferers of
diseases like Parkinson's and Alzheimer's may not receive critical
medical benefits that might otherwise have become available down the
road. Can it be that the government needs public reasons if it is to
coerce people not to hunt an endangered species of wolf, but that it can
curtail potential life-saving medical assistance on the basis of nonpublic
reasons? That would be paradoxical.
The stem-cell illustration also helps to show why we should not
draw a sharp distinction, as Rawls suggests, between ordinary political
issues and constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice. By
this categorization, whether to fund embryonic stem cell research is an
ordinary issue, whereas restricting abortion involves a basic question of
justice. Needless to say, the status of embryos is crucial for both issues.
To tell people they can use religious reasons to decide whether embryos
count for the first issue but not for the second would be confusing and
hard to justify.
Most proponents of public reasons have assumed that any
constraint applies to all liberal democracies and applies in the same
manner to officials and citizens, and in the same manner to grounds of
judgment and public discourse.15 My position differs on all three

14 The sentence in text collapses a much more complex analysis I offer in ESTABLISHMENT,
supra note I, at 500-20.
15 For a discussion of various arguments about how public reasons apply to citizens, see Paul
J. Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 125
(Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000).
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scores. This subject in political philosophy, like many others, needs to
be addressed in terms of the particular histories and cultures of various
societies. My view about the United States at present relies heavily on
distinctions between advocacy and justification, on the one hand, and
grounds of judgment, on the other, and between officials and ordinary
citizens.
When we think about how we make up our minds and how we
discuss issues, we realize that monitoring our discourse is a lot easier
than restricting our bases for decision. Moreover, other people hear our
discourse, but they cannot know our full grounds of decision. These
truths have great importance.
Most people would be hard put to try to carry out a program of
excluding their deepest religious convictions from their political
judgments. They could not disentangle what they believe because of
underlying religious convictions from what they would believe if they
relied only on premises of liberal democracy and shared techniques of
understanding (or on some other sketch of what exactly constitutes
public reasons).
Speaking without reference to religious convictions is not difficult.
Members of our law faculty share an assumption that school problems
are to be resolved in terms of values that are not explicitly connected to
particular comprehensive views. I have yet to hear a specifically
Jewish, Christian, atheist, or Benthamite argument for a faculty
decision. Yet, when decisions involve the point of legal education, I
doubt that colleagues try rigorously to remove the threads of their
religious understandings about the nature of society and education for a
profession.
If it is working, a constraint of public reasons is reciprocal. People
restrain themselves partly because they respond to the restraint of
others. People can tell easily whether arguments are being made from
explicit religious premises; they will know if restraint on their part
matched. If they try to purge their silent deliberations of religious
influence, they cannot be sure if others are similarly motivated. And
once someone realizes just how arduous this purging exercise is, he will
question the success of others, even if he thinks they are trying. Such
uncertainties are a poor basis for reciprocity.
Consider some differences between officials and ordinary citizens.
Officials have a lot more to do with the law that gets made and applied
than do citizens; there are a lot more citizens than officials. Officials
are used to making judgments and offering reasons that do not include
all that is relevant in their personal lives. Citizens are less used to
practicing such restraint. Perhaps a highly educated, participating
citizenry could learn to draw distinctions between what matters for most
aspects of life and what matters for politics. But that is not our
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citizenry. When officials practice restraint, that impinges much less on
a population's religious liberty than when citizens do so. Official
restraint more greatly affects the quality of political life. These basic
distinctions-between advocacy and judgment and between officials
and citizens-suggest that if any self-exclusion is justified, it is selfexclusion for officials in their public statements.
Among officials we can divide roughly between those who apply
law and those who either make law or exercise ordinary discretionary
judgment. Among those who apply law, judges and quasi-judicial
officials often provide reasoned justifications for their decisions. At this
stage of American history, one does not often find explicitly religious
grounding in opinions, even when courts reach beyond standard legal
sources to comment on the social benefits or harms of a possible ruling.
By an explicitly religious grounding, I mean reasoning in this form:
"Given a true religious proposition, these conclusions about social good
follow." Some examination of religious sources might be acceptable to
show the community's attitudes toward a practice or its deep moral
assumptions, and judges might employ familiar religious stories to
illustrate a point, but none of these is a reliance on religious grounds in
the sense that I mean. Although judicial opinions are rarely completely
candid about the strength of competing arguments, one expects judges
to rely on arguments they believe should have force for all judges. In
our culture, this excludes arguments based on particular religious
premises.
When we tum to legislators, we may start with the proposition that
if an explicit religious grounding were placed in the preamble to a
statute, that should be viewed as a promotion of religion that would
violate the Establishment Clause. Although the use of religious
language increased among legislators and executive officials during the
administrations of George W. Bush, it is still true that members of
Congress typically do not make religious arguments on the floor of
Congress or before their constituents. There is, however, no accepted
understanding that they should avoid giving any weight to their own
religious convictions, and to those of constituents, in the formulation of
their positions. I believe legislators should give greater weight to
reasons that are generally available than to those they understand are
not, but some reliance on religious and similar reasons is appropriate,
especially since the generally available reasons are radically indecisive
about some crucial social problems.
If legislators rely · on religious understandings more than their
public advocacy reflects, are they not lacking in candor? Does restraint
impoverish discourse and leave voters less well-informed than they
might be? Realism counsels that much of what legislators say is far
from fully candid, so self-restraint about religious grounds is hardly a
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major contributor to lack of candor. In any event the value of selfrestraint overrides this drawback and whatever reduction in information
voters suffer. Legislators should not deny religious bases that motivate
them, but they should not develop public arguments in these terms.
What I have said about legislators also applies to the president, and
to governors and mayors, when they propose and support legislation or
carry out executive responsibilities (including foreign policy).
Because citizens are not used to practicing self-restraint of this
kind, and because most citizens have little involvement in the political
process, I do not think they should regard themselves as constrained to
avoid relying on religious grounds or to avoid stating those grounds as
the main basis of their positions.
Religious leaders and organizations have a special place. They
properly develop religious grounds as these relate to political problems,
and they also properly take part in direct efforts to win support for
particular positions, although it is usually unfortunate when religious
leaders endorse parties or candidates.
As I have noted, much of the theorizing about public reasons and
religious reasons has been cast in terms of liberal democracies in
general. The history of western liberal democracies, forged out of
religious division, shows that differences in religious views can be a
source of intense conflict, but we can imagine people of various
religious views who seek to learn from one another and who trust one
another's social judgments. These people might welcome religious
perspectives in political discourse. On the other hand, one might not
recommend an explicitly religious politics as the most fruitful approach
for a newly constituted Northern Ireland or for the fledgling, fragile
union that may be emerging in Bosnia. Much depends on history,
culture, the religious and other broad views that people hold, and their
degree of mutual tolerance and respect. Specific principles of selfrestraint should be offered for particular political orders, not in gross.
The United States is a country of great diversity in culture and
religion. The percentage of our people that is neither Christian nor
Jewish increases steadily, with immigration policies that no longer
discriminate egregiously against Asians. Outright religious conflict is
rare, but religious differences remain a source of distrust and tension.
Religious convictions are intense and widespread enough to influence
politics and to disturb people with their influence. That is partly why
some restraint may be needed.
When we think about the difficulties of figuring out what reasons
are public ones, we might be drawn to a skeptical conclusion that any
theory of public reasons founders completely on the impossibility of
specifying just what reasons are public. But standing against this
skeptical rejection of any ideal of public reasons is the law. Is not the

2009]

SECULARISM, RELIGION, & DEMOCRACY

2399

law, and I mean here assessment of what the law provides, a domain in
which a theory of public reasons is realized? If so, does that not raise
the possibility at least that politics could be a domain of public reason?
Within the law, judges are supposed to rely on reasons that have
force for other judges, and the reasons need to be accessible-accessible
both in the sense of being comprehensible and in the sense of being
capable of being grasped on the basis of rational thought, not faith or
intuition. So the law limits relevant reasons; it requires that reasons be
understood by rational analysis and have a force that is generally
understood.
Without doubt, the distinctive character of law, and the
authoritative sources of law, lead to some reasons counting within the
law and others counting little or not at all in many contexts. For
example, the practice that misguided precedents are deemed to have
force is an aspect of common law jurisprudence.
But American lawyers may usually argue to judges that, in an
otherwise close case, one interpretation of a precedent or a reading of a
statute will promote justice or human welfare better than another. In
fact, the domain of relevant arguments in law is not much narrower than
the domain of relevant arguments in politics, although differences in
weight are critical. The considerations that determine whether reasons
are excluded resemble those that have been suggested for political life
by proponents of public reason.
The point is easiest to illustrate for determinations that judges must
make that do not depend much on authoritative statutes or precedents.
In virtually all states, the main standard for determinations of child
custody is the "best interests of the child." Suppose a judge must decide
whether to place a child with her father or with her mother, who is
living with another woman in an intimate relationship. The judge
should not refuse custody to the mother because the Bible condemns
homosexual relations as sinful. Nor should the judge announce the truth
of greatest happiness utilitarianism as the basis for resolving what is in
the child's best interest. The basis for excluding these possible reasons
is very similar to the arguments put forward by public reasons theorists
in respect to politics: the reasons do not have appropriately general
force and they rely too heavily on controversial overarching views.
If the law is a domain of public reasons, then it is at least possible
that in politics, people do have, or should have, a sense that reasons
should be public, and it is possible that that sense could strengthen and
sharpen over time, or that it could dissipate in the face of challenges that
God should not be removed from the public square.
As I have indicated, my own sense is that the constraint of public
reason applies primarily to the public expressions of officials, and that
saying just what count as public reasons in various contexts is no simple
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matter. The issues about public reason are predominantly not ones of
constitutional law, but the position I have taken fits well with the law of
our religion clauses and with secularism, in the senses of secularism that
genuinely apply to the United States.

